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ONE PHILOSOPHY FOR AN AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 
Paul K. Conkin* 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. By Morton 
White. New York: Oxford University Press. 1978. Pp. xii, 299. 
$15.95. 
The title of this book is misleading. Morton White realizes 
that no single body of beliefs, be they philosophical or not, in-
formed the thousands of individual choices that made possible a 
successful war for American independence, a war that only exem-
plifies some of the many definitions of a revolution. We do not 
even have conclusive evidence of any fully common beliefs among 
the quite diverse and quite large body of colonial leaders. In any 
case, this is not what White seeks. Instead, he takes the Preamble 
of the Declaration of Independence as his departing point and 
explores some possible epistemological assumptions reflected in 
the "self-evident" claim and some possible theological and meta-
physical assumptions behind the doctrine of unalienable rights. 
The key person, as almost always in such exploration, is Thomas 
Jefferson, the original author of the Declaration. Throughout, 
White intimates that Jefferson represented a rather broad con-
sensus in moral philosophy, but White rarely makes this claim in 
a precise and explicit way, and he vindicates it by only a few 
appeals to the expressed beliefs of John Adams, James Wilson, 
and Alexander Hamilton. 
White's purpose is neither carefully to verify descriptions of 
what Jefferson believed, nor rigorously to explore how he came to 
hold certain beliefs. We get little personal biography. White 
seems content to establish by biographical evidence that Jeffer-
son was in a position to hold certain views. White draws his major 
inferences about philosophical positions from texts, from the ac-
tual words of the Declaration of Independence, and from other 
roughly contemporaneous statements by Jefferson or by his con-
temporaries. Once he infers a lurking but unanalyzed belief 
among such Americans, he turns to major and much more explicit 
European intellectuals to explore its fullest implication. Thus, 
the several analytical essays that largely make up the book var-
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iously engage the meaning and implication of doctrines origi-
nated or developed not by Americans, but by such European 
mentors as Locke, Hutcheson, Pufendorf, and Burlamaqui. 
White occasionally sees a direct lineage, as from Burlamaqui to 
Jefferson, but he rarely develops the evidence for such direct 
links. 
This strategy largely finesses the all but unanswerable histor-
ical issues. Precisely what philosophical position did Jefferson 
really intend by his loftier moral statements? White does a lot of 
challengeable mind reading and often outfits an impressionable, 
elusive, and conventional Jefferson in some surprisingly logical 
and sophisticated philosophical dress. The probabilities in this 
game are always so low that other historians can suggest quite 
different but equally persuasive alternatives. More often than 
not, I suspect Jefferson had not thought through the subtler im-
plications of his language and that his words retained some mea-
sure of ambiguity. I find it hard to argue, as White often does, 
that major philosophical alternatives rose and fell with shifts of 
a single word in the Declaration, or that Jefferson or anyone else 
really perceived the subtler issues that now seem at stake. I am 
also confident that Jefferson borrowed much of the very elliptical 
wording of the Declaration from the earlier, less eloquent, but 
more explicit and precise Virginia Declaration of Rights, and that 
quite possibly he never struggled intellectually with many of the 
word choices that now seem so significant to White. Throughout 
this book, White all but ignores the American context, not only 
the practical urgencies but even the extensive American pam-
phlet literature that preceded the Declaration. I suspect his leap 
to Europe, and to major and reasonably systematic philosophers, 
oversimplified his task. 
. Such doubts challenge the historical credentials of such an 
abstract analytical excursion, not its usefulness. Whether Jeffer-
son followed Hutcheson or Burlamaqui in his understanding of 
natural law, or, more probably, made a typically eclectic use of 
both, the two points of view existed as intellectual options. Both 
provided Jefferson, had he so desired, philosophical tools for fill-
ing in all the ellipses of his Declaration or for fleshing out the 
exact meaning of his eloquent but often elusive language. They 
provide us such an opportunity today. I prefer to read White's 
book as an exploration of the possible meanings present in the 
original Declaration, or even those meanings that we may ascribe 
to such a living document today. For he is not concerned only 
with a description of eighteenth-century options, but offers his 
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evaluation of the present philosophical credentials of such doc-
trines. Present concerns, and personal preferences, clearly and 
correctly guided White in his selection of issues worth detailed 
exploration, as well as in his evaluation of their logical or episte-
mological credentials. In a few places, I suspect, present concerns 
also precluded his understanding past options. It is these lapses 
from historical accuracy that deserve extended exploration in this 
Review. 
In the first half of his book, White explores the "self-evident" 
claim. He believes that Jefferson, like most American moral 
theorists, adhered to some version of what he calls rationalistic 
intuitionism. To such theorists, certain moral obligations seemed 
as undoubtable and unchallengeable as Euclidian axioms. White 
uses Locke's Essay to exemplify a very sophisticated version of 
this theory. He is balanced and fair in his reading of Locke. He 
also clarifies some of the problems in any form of intuitionist 
claim. Intuitive principles are not innate, but in some sense 
learned, grasped, or inferred. Moral understanding requires 
thought and judgment. Yet, all who think carefully about certain 
moral issues will reach similar conclusions-for example, all will 
agree that one cannot make murder a rule of conduct. But this is 
no sooner said than it must be qualified. One who values life will 
not be able, consistently, to urge murder as a rule, as Kant 
pointed out. Given a universal commitment to the preservation 
and enhancement of human life, any condoning of murder is ob-
viously impermissible because it threatens such goals. But this 
seems to push back the problem. Is it self-evident that we should 
always value life? Surely not. Thus, moral claims, which usually 
relate to matters of fact but are not themselves cognitive state-
ments, always seem to beg issues of personal identity, of devel-
oped sentiments and preferences, of how one experiences things. 
White works out all these implications clearly. He also argues 
persuasively what I think is too obvious to justify his labor-that 
none of our major founding fathers were utilitarians. Of course, 
they often appealed to utility and believed that their moral ax-
ioms would indeed conduce to greater happiness for greater num-
bers. But they were unwilling to rest their appeal to principle on 
any interaction of developed commitments and matters of fact. 
They were afraid of any teleology that was only human and con-
textual. They wanted, somehow, to justify what ought to be by 
what eternally is. They appealed either to an essential human 
nature or to a creator and his purposes for man. Again, White 
carefully and at times brilliantly establishes what has long 
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seemed all but obvious-that in moral theory men like Jefferson 
still adhered to a cosmic teleology rooted either in Christian the-
ology or Aristotelian science. This distresses White, for all such 
supports for self-evident principles subvert the epistemological 
claim or fall into a vicious circularity. The so-called self-evident 
principles turn out to be only logical inferences from an ontologi-
cal position that itself begs grounds for beliefs. For example, 
without conclusive evidence for the existence of a purposeful crea-
tor and sustainer of our universe, and without evidenced knowl-
edge of his (or its) goals, the self-evident claim becomes only a 
sophistic camouflage of self-affirmation. 
This line of analysis leads White to the most distorting and 
diverting thesis of his book-that the Declaration was not a 
"democratic" document. He here creates an amazing straw-
man-that in some sense the Declaration of Independence either 
contained, or was widely believed to contain, a "democratic" 
justification for revolution. He has no basis for such an assump-
tion except a few off-handed statements to the effect that Jeffer-
son has gained a reputation as a democrat. If anything is clear, 
it is that the Declaration was not an appeal to any consensus, but 
to enlightened opinion and, beyond that, to the objective moral 
authority of a god and his creation. In the political sense, such 
an authoritarian appeal seems the very antithesis of democratic. 
Of course, the word "democratic" is impossibly loaded. White 
knows this and clarifies his rather unusual meaning-by 
"democratic" he here refers to the political implications of var-
ious moral theories. A "democratic" moral· argument would be 
one that the people..:....literally everyone-understand and re-
spond to. Thus, if self-evident principles are "democratic," they 
must not involve esoteric or technical knowledge and must not be 
the property of a moral elite. By this criterion, the self-evident 
claim in the Declaration, and its supporting ontology, cannot 
qualify as "democratic." The insights are too subtle, the support-
ing arguments too refined for the untutored to understand, as 
anyone can testify who has struggled with all the intricacies of 
natural law theory. This seems to White either deplorable, disap-
pointing, or at least contrary to conventional assumptions. Since 
Locke indicted the elitist and arbitrary political potential of ap-
peals to innate ideas, White feels justified in proving, as did 
Hobbes, that intuitively self-evident axioms almost equally lend 
themselves to elitist abuse, to a Gnostic-like moral dictatorship 
of priests, judges, or philosophers who alone claim fullest access 
to what is true or to what is beautiful. 
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Such purported elitist implications are, of course, present in 
the Declaration. But they are present in any moral discourse. 
White builds a vast argument around a vacuous comparison. His 
point would repay beating through three chapters only if one 
could identify any moral theory that' was "democratic" in his 
perverse sense of the word. White never identifies any truly demo-
cratic moral theory, for some conditions-of intellectual effort, of 
accepted logical conventions, of knowledge of context, of honesty 
in matters of taste-qualify any conceivable moral theory. Moral 
discourse always departs from a felt apprehension that some peo-
ple either misbehave or misunderstand what is good in the way 
of behavior. A world in which everyone was morally perfect, or 
even perfectly understood their moral obligations, would have no 
need for moral philosophy. The very game itself has a built-in 
qualification-that people need to attend to their behavior or to 
their thinking about behavior. Thus, in the natural law tradition, 
one had to appeal, not to the diverse perceptions and understand-
ings of everyman, -but to right reason, to people who· are con-
cerned, to those who will think carefully on moral issues. No one 
is born a moral philosopher any more than one is born well versed 
in Euclidian axioms. But, so the theory went, anyone with ordi-
nary human intelligence can come to understand either and to 
recognize their undoubted validity. If this is elitism, so be it. 
Even utilitarian theory, which seems more congenial to White, 
requires an active and often very demanding attention to matters 
of sentiment and of fact. Morality is never something sponta-
neous. The only "democratic" claim in any moral theory is al-
ways one of possibility-anyone can understand. 
This political perspective guides White's analysis of the 
Scottish moral-sense view so often identified with Jefferson. 
White presents such a theory as an alternative to rationalistic 
intuitionism, and in the late eighteenth century it often seemed 
so. White thus argues, as against the recent claims of Garry Wills, 
that a youthful Jefferson adhered to the intuitionist view and only 
later embraced the moral-sense position. Given such disjunctive 
options, I agree with White. On textual grounds, the wording in 
the Declaration supports an intuitionist view and with it the re-
strictive, juristic meaning that White finds in the concept of 
human equality, and not the more radical sense of equal abilities 
that Wills reads into it. Jefferson later insisted that an overly 
intellectualized understanding of morality was false to the 
facts-simple people are often not only the most moral (this 
might be because of habit) but also exemplify refined moral sensi-
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bility in their judgments of other people. This makes the idea of 
a moral faculty appear a nonintellectual alternative to natural 
law, even if the moral content ends up being identical, and also 
rests- morality on a theoretical viewpoint which seems more con-
sistent with an equalitarian political order. But as White makes 
clear, Jefferson recognized that the moral faculty has to grow and 
develop. In a less intellectualized context, this still suggests a 
moral elite made up of all those with a healthy, mature moral 
sense. Jefferson only shifted his criteria from intellectual stan-
dards to esthetic norms, from logical acuity to a cultivated moral 
sensibility. Such a shift might, indeed, suggest that we should 
seek out the moral aristocrats of a society among simple plowmen 
and not learned schoolmen. 
I distrust this reading of Jefferson's shifting commitments. It 
depends too much on the analysis of a few texts and again as-
sumes too much in the way of philosophical self-consciousness. 
Intuitionist and moral-sense appeals interpenetrate too much to 
vindicate the argument that there was a major shift in Jefferson's 
moral theory, although no doubt he found the Scottish view in-
creasingly congenial. But the moral-sense position is not neces-
sarily inconsistent with more intuitive or intellectualist views. 
Much more than White suggests, the two emphases can comple-
ment each other. Scottish philosophers, such as Francis Hutche-
son, joined Jonathan Edwards in offering anesthetic conception 
of virtue. Virtuous acts are beautiful, and those who observe them 
rush to praise because of intrinsic qualities in the acts and not 
because of contemplated outcomes or reference to some carefully 
thought-out moral theory. People have a mental faculty that rec-
ognizes and endorses certain actions. Note that such a theory 
relates directly to human action, or to complaisance toward such 
action. One does not need to have the guidance of self-evident 
axioms to be kind or generous or to celebrate such qualities in 
others. 
Such a focus upon the act, and upon a very primitive type 
of moral taste or sensibility, does not preclude very useful think-
ing about one's behavior. Experience itself, or certain qualities 
present in experience, bring one into a moral universe, but an 
esthetic response is nevertheless an inadequate tool of moral 
judgment or criticism. The moral sense can be generous but still 
blind to long-term consequences. Thus, such anesthetic founda-
tion is not inconsistent with hard intellectual work or with ethical 
systems that merge sensibility and intellect. Insofar as people 
such as Jefferson believed in self-evident moral axioms, albeit 
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axioms learned through intellectual effort, they could see these as 
indispensable critical tools. In fact, few moralists are ever able to 
remain at either pole or extreme-at only sensibility or only intel-
lectual guidelines. Hutcheson did not. In the context of act and 
character, taste predominates; in the area of rule-making, intel-
lect dominates. It is not surprising that Jefferson, as determined 
a moralist as we have had in American history, easily moved back 
and forth between both theories, variously stressing whichever 
seemed most consistent with practical contexts or argumentative 
purposes. 
In the second half of his book, White explores the meaning, 
and the ontological foundations, of unalienable rights. He skirts 
the classical and medieval development of natural law theory and 
touches on only a few of its modem developments. Again, he is 
attuned to a few texts, not to broader continuities. He proves, and 
I suspect no one doubts, that even Jefferson's conception of natu-
ral law depended upon a belief in a creative and benevolent deity 
and upon his purposes for man. To White, a natural law expresses 
a duty or obligation consistent with man's essence and God's will. 
A natural right is a power or leeway to act consistently with one's 
God-given nature. Such rights are unalienable, not in the sense 
that they cannot be taken away from a person, but in the sense 
that one cannot give them up or transfer them without violating 
moral law. Such a near-governmental meaning of right did gain 
some credence in the eighteenth century, but White drastically 
oversimplifies the issues by suggesting that any one meaning ever 
prevailed, even in the thought of Jefferson. The word "right" 
remained loaded, full of ambiguities. Contrary to White's argu-
ments, a much more traditional meaning, one tied more to iden-
tity or status than to behavioral leeway or to power, remained 
persuasive in the eighteenth century. A right, in this sense, is a 
possessive moral claim, a part of rather than a function of the 
essence of man. Such a right is the opposite of a wrong and is 
literally unalienable-no matter what a person does, or what oth-
ers do to him, he retains a right to his life and his liberty. Even 
as a slave, he still possesses the right of liberty. 
Given his functional orientation to rights, it is not surprising 
that White attends most carefully to life and to happiness. In 
doing so, he slights liberty and completely distorts all the histori-
cal issues tied to the word "property." Like so many other recent 
historians, White sees the three unalienable rights of the Declara-
tion as parallel, which suggests that "pursuit of happiness" was 
Jefferson's chosen substitute for property. This seems the most 
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obvious reading, but it faces enormous problems. Traditionally, 
the three rights of life, liberty, and property always came first, 
to be followed by happiness as a more summative or encompass-
ing term. Most American states followed this pattern in their 
declarations of right. In doing so, they adhered to traditional 
state-of-nature conventions, in which the protection or preserva-
tion of these three fully interactive and inseparable rights-life, 
liberty, and property-was the minimal necessity for human hap-
piness and thus the minimal and justifying moral end of any 
government. The emphasis upon happiness goes back at least to 
early Calvinist political theory, when this term began to gain 
equal status with justice or security. The emphasis upon happi-
ness did not, as White suggests, derive from a new, more benevo-
lent eighteenth-century conception of a deity who not only cre-
ated man to be happy, but even made the pursuit of happiness 
an obligation. Given the developed tradition, I believe the best 
guess is that Jefferson, probably for literary reasons, reduced the 
normal trinity of rights to only two-life and liberty-but kept 
happiness as a summative term. This makes sense if one reads 
the abbreviated statement in the Declaration as an exceedingly 
elliptical version of the earlier Virginia Declaration of Rights, 
which spelled out in quite explicit detail the traditional rights of 
man: "the enjoyment oflife and liberty, with the means of acquir-
ing and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happi-
ness and safety." 
What about property? No contemporary historian seems 
willing to deal honestly with the issues here. Present :meanings 
seem always to intrude. The word "property" is a bundle of ambi-
guities. By the time of the French Revolution Jefferson came to 
realize this, a realization that gives some credence to the argu-
ment that he deliberately left the word out of the Declaration. 
The problem is one of meaning, not of words. In natural law 
theory, the word "property" gained full equality with life and 
liberty only at the time of the Reformation. But for any careful 
moral theorist, including Locke, only certain types of property 
deserved such a st~tus. If one is to preserve his life, he must eat. 
If he is to be at liberty, independent of the control of other men, 
he must have access to natural goods or to productive resources 
and also must be able to keep the products of his own labor. If 
"property" means such access and such control, then it is insep-
arable from life and liberty. Such access and such control does 
not require private ownership; communal property may equally 
well meet the moral imperative. Thus, "property" in its broadest 
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meaning may be a natural and unalienable right totally apart 
from any conventions that undergird private property. Given the 
early Christian experiment in communism and the continued 
communalism of several monasteries, Christian theorists up 
through Aquinas stopped short of making even strictly qualified 
private ownership a natural and unalienable right. In the sense 
that White uses the term, Aquinas did make private property an 
adventitious right, although one quite essential in the social con-
text of European nations. But the legal form that such private 
property always takes is, to some extent, conventional, a matter 
of political choice and not of man's essence or God's will. 
Protestant theorists raised private property to the level of a 
natural and unalienable right. In order to do so they had to cir-
cumscribe such private ownership by all manner of qualifications, 
such as need and responsible use. Even more critical, they had 
to support it by arguments in behalf of natural plenty. Even 
Locke denied any natural right to monopoly property and forbade 
enclosure if land of equal fertility was not still in the commons 
and thus available for other people. By the time of Jefferson, most 
of the earlier moral content in the concept of natural property 
could already best be translated as "economic opportunity." The 
states, in stressing the right to acquire, still gave some lip service 
to earlier meanings. But in such a positive sense American gov-
ernments did not live up to the implications of natural property. 
Instead, in their positive laws concerning private possessions, the 
states certified all but unlimited accumulation, endorsed growing 
rents, and thus permitted the exclusion of more and more people 
from ownership. This led, by 1829, to the agrarian claims of 
Thomas Skidmore and others that Jefferson had betrayed the 
American people by his flaccid euphemism, "pursuit of happi-
ness." This euphemism allowed our governments to renege on 
their highest obligation-to assure everyone their right to prop-
erty, that is, their right to obtain their equal share of what God 
had given to all mankind. 
White addresses none of these subtleties. In fact, he seems 
totally oblivious to even the ambiguities in the word property and 
characteristically uses a gold watch as an example of private 
property. Since it is not immoral to give away (to alienate) such 
a gold watch, then property cannot be an unalienable right. Of 
course, one gives away a watch, not necessarily one's moral claim 
to it, for such a claim is implicit in giving as much as in selling. 
And if we substitute for the watch food necessary for the survival 
of one's family, or the productive resources necessary for one to 
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earn a living, one can see quite easily how one cannot morally 
justify giving away property. It would then be an unalienable 
right even in White's peculiarly functional sense of right. By su-
perficial arguments about watches, White reveals his own restric-
tive, commodity-like use of the word "property." Thus, as is char-
acteristic of contemporary American intellectuals, he so con-
ceives of property as to make it, not an essential aspect of one's 
personality, of one's chance for happiness and fulfillment, but a 
potential obstacle to such happiness. Here we obviously flounder 
in a tyranny of words, and White is not the first to wade all but 
blindly into such a semantic jungle. After all, either hypocritical 
or morally insensitive Americans soon appealed to a right of prop-
erty even in defense of slavery. 
I must emphasize that White's problem here is, strangely 
enough, a failure to be analytical. He surrenders his philosophical 
credentials. Behind the verbal confusion, he clearly favors a very 
positive government obligation in the economic area, or some-
thing close to the root meanings of property in the natural law 
tradition. White finds momentous implications in a shift, appar-
ently approved by Jefferson, from an original draft of the Declara-
tion which made it the duty of government "to secure these 
ends"-life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness-to an obligation in 
the final draft "to secure these rights." To White, ends entail a 
positive role for government, one not only of protecting rights (a 
negative duty), but of doing what is needed to help people secure 
such goals. I suspect he reads too much into such a word shift and 
sets up an impossible disjunction between negative and positive 
guarantees. He even sees here evidence of a deep ambivalence in 
Jefferson, who is at one point a libertarian fearful of other than 
limited government, at another a person quite willing to use gov-
ernment as a tool to help people become happy. Thus, White 
believes Jefferson, at his best, was really an early advocate of a 
welfare state. I suspect that all such arguments are viciously 
presentist. 
White's distinctive, often highly private reading of natural 
rights theory brings him back at the end of the book to the same 
sermon he preached against self-evident truths. Natural law and 
natural right theories can also subvert the possibilities of 
"democracy." Here, "democracy" does not so much denote a con-
sensus on moral theory as full political participation. Even 
though Jefferson left property out of the Declaration, almost 
every other American leader embraced ill-defined property rights 
and clothed them all with the sanctity of natural law. For exam-
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pie, in the Revolutionary era those leaders continued older fran-
chise rules; they joined property qualifications with sexual and 
racial criteria to deny citizenship to a majority of Americans. 
They argued that one without property was dependent, unable to 
function as an agent and thus as a responsible citizen. Once 
again, moral dictators had their way, and even persuaded simple 
people to go along. White does not take such an association of 
property with citi?enship seriously enough to analyze its meaning 
or to consider its logical and factual justification. He simply sees 
such a flagrant and undemocratic abuse of a doctrine as a perfect 
illustration of his central claim-that any intuitive moral claim 
or any appeal to the essence of man or to the will of a creator is a 
potentially dangerous weapon of an arrogant elite. It is hard for 
me to conceive of any moral theory not subject to such abuse, but 
it does seem incumbent upon White, if he is to use this as an 
example of abuse, to clarify exactly why it is so. After all, I had 
always supposed, with Skidmore and to a certain extent even 
with John Adams, that the tie between voting and property made 
good sense and that the moral implication of such a relationship 
was not so much disfranchisement as government policies ade-
quate to provide everyone a realistic opportunity of owning prop-
erty. 
I have emphasized the weaknesses of White's book, not its 
strengths. I applaud much that he attempts. He is concerned, 
except for the one case of property, to penetrate the veil of words 
and to find the various concepts that lay behind them. Once 
launched on an analytical excursion, White is meticulously logi-
cal in his inferences. But I still find his book surprisingly unen-
lightening. Over half of it involves analytical clarifications of 
what has long been obvious to historians. So many of White's 
strawmen would embarrass a recent high school text. And by 
narrowing his analytical focus, by working with a few texts or a 
few key statements, White often moves into an abstract limbo far 
removed from any specific historical context. Why, for example, 
does he work with a few phrases in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and all but ignore the numerous and much more explicit 
state declarations of rights? Finally, even though equipped with 
the needed analytical tools, White is not a sensitive moral theo-
rist. He moves awkwardly through the subject matter of tradi-
tional moral philosophy. Consequently, he is blind to most sub-
tleties and nuances. This may be because he is not sympathetic 
enough to Christian theology and natural law theory to present 
them at their best, however persuasive his reading of detached 
bits and pieces. 
